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Rather than excluding a potential role for the military, many European states rely on it to face a 
complex security scenario. What are the reasons behind this activism? Taking Italy as a case study, 
this article works out two main arguments (ideational factors and interests relating to the so-called 
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Mediterranean (2015-). Ultimately, this effort contributes to understanding the role of the military 
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1) Introduction 
 
The end of the Cold War has considerably shaped the identity of all the European armed forces, 
which have tried to adapt to the emergence of new threats in a complex strategic context.  
Accordingly, European countries have been facing a challenging military transformation in recent 
decades. The need to ‘rethink’ the military instrument has gradually come to be viewed as a 
pressing requirement, especially for those states that have radically modified their defence policy in 
the post-bipolar era.  
Following several years of inaction during the Cold War, Italy has shifted into the role of security 
provider. As of the 1990s, political leaders and public opinion have conceived the military 
instrument as a key asset in Italian foreign policy (Ignazi et al. 2012). Italy has raised its “profile in 
European affairs, in transatlantic relations and in various arenas of the globe, with its troops, 
interests and resources” (Brighi 2013, 6). Moreover, it has fine-tuned its strategy, structure and tools 
to prevent and oppose new threats: humanitarian emergencies, piracy and transnational organized 
crime, among others. As illustrated by the recent White Paper (2015), Italian defence has focused 
intensely on “multidimensional threats” to national security. 1 
Although Italy has recently widely deployed military forces to deal with such multidimensional 
challenges, the literature has not spilled too much ink in analysing them.2 Hence, this article aims 
primarily to fill this gap, considering Italy and the operations undertaken (or not) in Sri Lanka 
(2004-2005), Haiti (2010), and the Central Mediterranean (2015-). It examines why Italy 
specifically adopted military tools (instead of civilian and diplomatic instruments) to deal with the 
non-military menaces represented by these cases. Indeed, the question implicitly refers to the tasks 
of the military in multifaceted and unprecedented operations. By presenting two main arguments 
(ideational factors and interests relating to the so-called military-industrial complex) emerging from 
                                                
1 See: Ministero della Difesa. 2015. Libro Bianco per la difesa e la sicurezza nazionale. Roma: 
Ministero della Difesa. 
2 Some exceptions are Strazzari (2008) and Ceccorulli (2012).  
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the interplay between internal and external dynamics as tools for analysis, this article paves the way 
for a comparative assessment of states’ employment of the armed forces to face non-conventional 
challenges.  
Extensively based on primary and secondary sources, this paper briefly introduces the evolution of 
European and Italian thinking over defence after the Cold War. Then it goes through the two main 
arguments proposed to understand Italy’s military activism and the methodology followed for the 
case analysis. In the empirical section each argument is weighed according to the contribution 
provided to the decision in favour of Italian intervention with the military. The conclusions 
illustrate the main findings, providing insights for further research. 
 
2) European and Italian defence in post-Cold War security 
The non-military dimension of security challenges has been widely illustrated by official post-
bipolar documents and doctrines. None of the menaces identified by the European Security Strategy 
of 2003 was purely military. In addition, the new Agenda on Security (2015), , has further 
contributed to blurring the distinction between domestic and external challenges and between 
security and defence. 3  The new European Global Strategy, released in June 2016, talks of 
“principled pragmatism”: idealistic aspirations and a strong sense of responsibility are said to guide 
the EU’s actions in peace-building and fostering human security, together with a realistic 
assessment of the current strategic environment exposed to challenges as variegated as terrorism, 
cyber attacks and energy disruption.4 The armed forces’ new activism abroad has been testified, 
among others, by the NATO ‘activity’ in the Aegean Sea in 2016 in the context of the refugee 
crisis; by the launch of Operation Sea Guardian (ex Article 5 Operation Active Endeavour) also in 
                                                
3 See European Commission (2015), The European Agenda on Security, COM (2015), 28 April 
2015; European Parliament (2015), Towards a new European Security Strategy? Assessing the 
impact of changes in the global security environment, Directorate-General for External Policies. 
4 European Union (2016), A Global Strategy for The European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, June 2016. 
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2016; and by the European EUNAVFOR-MED operation against human smugglers in the Central 
Mediterranean. 
On the whole, Italian defence has proven to be noticeably active in the post-Cold War era, 
participating in all significant operations undertaken by the Western allies, from Afghanistan to the 
Balkans (Coticchia 2014). The Italian armed forces have been extensively employed to address 
multidimensional and transnational challenges, such as irregular migration and organized crime. 
The ‘Report on the Information Policy for Security’, published in February 2016, has particularly 
emphasized the relevance of these threats for Italy.5 The recent Italian ‘White Book’ pays specific 
attention to non-conventional threats and mainly to the “risks posed by migration, pandemics, 
terrorism and organized crime”6, emphasizing the necessity to rethink the whole military instrument. 
The launch of operation ‘Mare Sicuro’ in the Central Mediterranean perfectly mirrors the idea 
behind pursuing defence through active security engagement abroad and offers an example of how 
ideas and interests play out to ensure maritime security.  
Therefore, the advantage of looking at Italy’s military interventions and new security threats is that 
we both get a better understanding of the evolution of Italian foreign policy in the current strategic 
scenario and can start to investigate the new role of the military in facing new challenges, a 
neglected but easily replicable avenue of research. 
Indeed, as highlighted by Isernia, the Italian post-Cold War ‘military’ dynamism represents a 
crucial question analysed by the (limited) literature on Italian foreign policy.7 Several alternative 
explanations have been provided: strategic’ adjustment and the need to protect national security 
(Cucchi 1993), acquisition of prestige and international recognition (Davidson 2011), and 
multilateral constraints (Bonvicini et al. 2011). A different line of enquiry has considered the 
driving role of ideas and values (Ignazi et al. 2012). All of these arguments are solid and intercept 
                                                
5 Sistema di Informazione per la Sicurezza della Repubblica, Roma: 2016. 
6  Ministero della Difesa (2015), Libro Bianco per la difesa e la sicurezza nazionale. Roma: 
Ministero della Difesa, 3. 
7 On this point, as well as on the broader debate regarding the post WWII Italian foreign policy, see 
Isernia in this Special Issue.  
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important realities of Italy’s intervention abroad. The debate has focused especially on “recurrent 
elements” or “constant variables” in Italian foreign policy. Yet, some of them, such as those based 
on prestige, multilateralism (which is strictly related to Italy’s institutional ‘bonds’ constituted by 
the EU, the UN and NATO) or ‘strategic adjustment’, do not tell us why Italy has specifically 
adopted the military instrument to contrast non-military threats.8 For instance, the answer provided 
by the ‘multilateral context’ is not methodologically relevant here, given that acting within a 
multilateral framework has traditionally represented a constant rather than a variable factor in the 
decision-making process.9  
According to Kaarbo, many of the International Relations theories still ignore “decades of research 
in foreign policy analysis on how domestic political and decision-making factors affect actors’ 
choices and policies” (2015, 189). This paper strives to fill this gap. Before looking at the empirical 
section, the next paragraph briefly illustrates the two potential (interrelated and non-exclusive) 
arguments (partially derived from the above-mentioned hypotheses) on the “dispositions” (Doty 
1993) that made it possible for the Italian decision makers to employ the armed forces (rather than 
civilian tools) to deal with non-military menaces.  
 
2.1 Culture, interests and foreign policy 
 
According to Carlsnaes (2002), while relative agreement exists on the explanandum of foreign 
policy, a lack of consensus persists on the explanans, especially concerning the attempts to combine 
                                                
8 On the “permanent factors” of Italian foreign policy see, among others, Ignazi et al (2012). This 
paper does not examine the whole Italian post-Cold War defence policy. Rather, the aim is to focus 
only on interventions using the military, defined as ‘the movement of regular troops or forces 
(airborne, seaborne, shelling, etc.) of one country inside another, in the context of some political 
issue or dispute’ (Pearson and Baumann 1993, 1). Moreover, the ‘disputes’ or the ‘controversies’ 
under investigation feature the presence of non-military threats. 
9  Only limited exceptions exist, such as ‘Pellicano’ (Albania, 1991) and ‘Mare Nostrum’ 
(Mediterranean, 2013-2014).  
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and integrate alternative explaining variables.10  Kaarbo and Cantir (2012) focus on integrating 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Role Theory and National Role Conceptions (NRC), stressing 
how FPA can provide insights into the mass—elite nexus and intra-elite conflicts, while the NRC 
literature could incorporate the use of ideas and identity in foreign policymaking.  
As for the explanandum, the article focuses on selected foreign policy decisions to employ (or not) 
military forces to address non-military challenges, and illustrates the whole decision-making 
process behind these outcomes. Thus, we examine the “recurring forms of action - or inaction” 
undertaken by the state in the global scenario (Rosenau 1969, 54). To do this, the work focuses on 
the formation of domestic preferences, by looking at the political elites and significant social groups 
(e.g. the armed forces) that are involved in the decision-making process. Specifically, merging the 
analyses that have already investigated the interactions between the Italian domestic structure and 
the international context (Panebianco 1977) and the above-mentioned Foreign Policy Analysis 
approach, we illustrate the intersection between “the primary determinants of state behaviour: 
material and ideational factors” (Hudson 2005, 3). But how can we investigate what Miranda (2011) 
calls the “striking balance” between ideas and interest in the case of Italian foreign and defence 
policy? 
Regarding Italy, Croci and Valigi (2013) distinguish three main factors that constrain the 
formulation of foreign policy: material capabilities, interconnected ideas or policy paradigms, and 
the role of civil servants, such as foreign ministries. Lombardi (2011) and Miranda (2011) assess 
the role played by “normative considerations” and material factors such as trade relations to offer an 
explanation to the Italian military intervention in Libya. 11  On the whole, constructivists and 
rationalists adopt two different approaches. 
In conformity with a constructivist perspective, ideas strongly influence actors’ preferences. Ideas 
represent “the point of mediation between actors and their environment” (Brighi 2013, 36). Kitchen 
                                                
10 On this point see Isernia in this special issue. 
11 According to Houghton, FPA should pay more attention to the ways “social rules and norms 
affect decision making” (2007, 40). 
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highlights how in states where particular ideas are highly institutionalized or culturally embedded 
“the impact of ideas is likely to be strong and consistent throughout the policy process” (2010, 141). 
Finnemore believes that the normative context even affects the “conceptions of interest” (1996, 
310). Therefore, a rigid separation between norms, values and ‘interests’ could be problematic due 
to their endogenous construction.  
On the contrary, “rationalists believe that actors’ interests are exogenously determined” (Reus-Smit 
2009, 197). From a realist view, interests are given and predetermined, while from a liberal-
institutional perspective, interests should correspond to the societies the governments represent. 
According to liberalism, the outcomes in foreign policy are strictly related to the cabinets’ 
expectations as to the consequences of their actions. 
Scholars (Risse 2000) have contrasted rationalism and constructivism through March and Olsen’s 
“logic of consequences” (according to which actors behave strategically to reach goals) and “logic 
of appropriateness” (with actors behaving in conformity with social norms). Nonetheless, the 
literature has highlighted ontological and epistemological problems in adopting this demarcation, 
given that rationalism too could be considered a “social construction”. As such, states could 
rationally pursue socially constructed goals. Deets considers Putnan’s two-level game “incomplete 
because of how it clearly separates domestic and international levels and because it leaves questions 
on the formation of interests unexplored” (2009, 54). States may form security relationships based 
on shared identities and values, and many security relationships “are driven by a mix of both 
identity and interests” (Sledem and Strom, forthcoming). For instance, Miranda (2011) recognizes 
the interlinked and dynamic relationship between norms and interest in Italian foreign and defence 
policy and, consequently, the need to ‘unpack’ these concepts to carefully evaluate their role.12 In 
her work, Miranda focuses on norms aimed at “serving universal gods” (2011, 3), such as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), because a “pure-interest based foreign policy” cannot pursue these 
universal aims. Others (Sledem and Strom, forthcoming) illustrate the crucial role of language in 
                                                
12 On norms, ideas and Italian foreign policy see also Caffarena and Gabusi in this Special Issue.  
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empirically understanding state identity and state interests. In line with Locatelli and Carati, 
“although it is problematic to clearly distinguish norms and interests as two separate drivers of 
foreign policy, it is still important to understand what kind of norms a state refers to when it decides 
to take on a military intervention” (2017, 7). Thus, as posed by Dixon, even if humanitarian 
intervention could be considered as a ‘cover’ for material interests, we should investigate “why 
there was a need for a cover, and why humanitarian rationale was being used as that cover” (2013, 
159). The saliency of the ‘humanitarian intervention’ illustrates the relevance of a particular 
normative context that somehow shapes the ways actors behave. Conversely, the explicit reference 
to material interests as a primary justification for an intervention highlights their pre-eminence in 
the political decision to intervene.  
In line with these claims the paper examines in detail the decision-making process and the 
“dispositions” (Doty 1993) that made it possible for Italy to reach a very specific outcome: the 
employment of military forces to address non-military threats. In other words, the paper takes into 
consideration the relative salience of ideational and material factors in a peculiar process of 
preference formation to trace their relevance and understand how the “practice” (Doty 1993, 298) of 
using armed forces to face non-military challenges has been possible.  
 
2.2. Italian strategic and military culture vs. the ‘industrial-military complex’ 
 
Alons distinguishes between the “economic dimension of national interest”, by looking at the ways 
through which states maximize economic advantages or trade opportunities, and the state’s 
“ideological interests”, such as defending shared principles and values (2007, 215). Following such 
an approach, we focus on two different ‘ideological’ and ‘economic’ interests, or – conversely – on 
ideas vs. pure utilitarian interests. Bearing in mind the above-mentioned problematic distinction 
between values and interests, the paper unpacks the two concepts and highlights two specific 
dimensions. 
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First, we focus on the Italian ‘humanitarian strategic and military culture’. According to this 
argument (related to Alons’s “ideological interests”), Italy intervenes with its armed forces to face 
non-military challenges because of its specific post-Cold War strategic and military culture. As 
advanced by constructivists (Finnemore 1998; Rathbun 2004), the ways in which the cultural lens 
interprets global norms is extremely relevant in shaping foreign and defence policy decisions. 
Accordingly, a ‘cosmopolitan’ understanding of security informs operations together with a sense 
of international/national responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance.13 The employment of the 
military instrument would be a by-product of the sedimentation within national strategic culture of 
global norms and values related to ‘humanitarian interventions’ that Italy has shared and elevated as 
a potential determinant of foreign interventions. In line with Gray (1991), strategic culture is a set of 
“attitudes, beliefs and procedures that a community learns, teaches and practices”. The recent 
literature (Ignazi et al. 2012; Rosa 2014) helps operationalize Italian strategic culture,14  while 
stressing the crucial role played by frames such as peace, humanitarianism, and – above all – a 
multidimensional (and non-military) view of post-Cold War security.15 As evidenced above, Italian 
defence is no longer limited to the protection of frontiers but aims to guarantee a broader area of 
stability through the armed forces.  
Finally, relating to the military culture, and in line with an appropriateness logic, the structure and 
approach of the Italian forces (e.g. with mixed police-armed forces such as the Carabinieri) have 
also been portrayed by national strategic documents as ‘perfectly suited’ to dealing with the current 
‘complex emergencies’ at play in urban contexts.16 In sum, in conformity with the first argument, 
                                                
13 For a broader perspective on how the literature has already focused on the Italian "internalization 
of the external constraints" see Isernia in this Special Issue.  
14  In line with Rosa: “the concept of strategic culture is here understood to be a set of 
institutionalized beliefs within a society, transmitted through socialization mechanisms, regarding 
the roles of war, international relations and the use of force in foreign policy” (2014, 89).   
15 For further details on the operationalization of Italian “humanitarian” and “accommodationist” 
strategic culture, see Ignazi et al. (2012) and Rosa (2014).  
16 See Coticchia and Moro (2015).  
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we expect that the ‘dispositions’ of Italian decision-makers towards the deployment of armed forces 
would be affected by overwhelming references to a ‘humanitarian strategic and military culture’. 
The second argument (in line with Alons’s “economic dimension of interest”) pertains to the 
‘material dimension’: the protection of specific interests of national companies. Arena and Palmer 
(2009) address the effect of economic circumstances on the international behaviour of democracies, 
focusing on the role of varying domestic constraints (e.g. economic circumstances) to better glean 
the impact of domestic pressures on leaders’ decisions. Within this economic dimension, the paper 
considers the relevance of specific interests, in particular of the military companies. Several authors 
have emphasized the crucial role of the ‘industrial-military complex’ in fostering a post-Cold War 
Italian dynamism. For instance, Vignarca and Paolicelli (2009) illustrate how Italian defense 
industry has been able to promote expensive and long-term programmes to support the wide range 
of national military operations even after the beginning of the financial crisis17. 
Hence, we expect that the interests of the so-called Italian ‘industrial-military complex’ would 
illustrate the decision makers’ dispositions to deploy military forces to contrast non-military threats. 
In other words, each crisis, even if not featuring military challenges, could represent a good 
occasion to test and promote brand-new Italian military technologies. The remarkable saliency of 
this argument would also illustrate the presence of specific national military company interests 
within the normative context of the decision-making process. 
In this article these arguments are assessed through a comparative analysis of different cases of 
intervention with the military. While we do not expect policymakers to be completely crystal-clear 
in their narratives and their motivations, the parliamentary debates assure a full-spectrum scenario 
of possible arguments and options on the table.18 Other sources (newspapers, comments, reports, 
etc.) also help the process to trace and highlight the overall ‘dispositions’ towards the deployment 
                                                
17 On Italian Defense industry see Caruso and Locatelli (2013).  
18 ‘A priori’ opposition to military means has more than once proved not to be given in the Italian 
landscape (Operation ‘Mare Nostrum’ was welcomed by traditionally non-military-prone parties). 
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of armed forces in cases where self-interests clearly emerge behind an outward logic of 
appropriateness. 
 
3) Empirical Analysis 
 
The relative saliency of the two different ideational and material factors (‘humanitarian strategic 
and military culture’ and ‘interests of the industrial-military complex’) is scrutinized within the 
process that led Italian decision makers to deploy armed forces instead of civilian tools in 
interventions abroad. The selected cases vary in terms of geographical proximity, security 
challenges, ruling cabinet and nature of the mission.19 The analysis focuses on the post-2001 era, 
parameterizing key factors such as the international scenario (after 9-11) and the political system 
(the so-called ‘Second Republic’). The interventions in Haiti and the Mediterranean illustrate the 
ways through which Italian defence has addressed multidimensional crises with military tools. On 
the contrary, the (civil) mission in Sri Lanka allows the dependent variable to vary, in that it 
presents a case where the Italian decision makers preferred to face the crisis through civilian assets 
(Civil Protection, NGOs, etc.). 
 
3.1) Sri Lanka 
 
A devastating tsunami caused more than 280,000 deaths in South-east Asia (and beyond) at the end 
of 2004. Sri Lanka was one of the countries most damaged by the natural disaster, reporting 30,000 
victims and more than one million internally displaced people.20 Right from the start of the crisis 
Italy was considerably active in providing humanitarian support to the country, where several 
                                                
19 On the debate regarding continuity and discontinuity of post-Cold War Italian foreign policy 
across different political coalitions see: Croci (2002) and Brighi (2006). 
20 Joint Report of the Government of Sri Lanka and Development Partners, December 2005.  
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Italian NGOs already operated.21 On 26 December 2004 the Italian Government gave authorization 
to the ‘new’ Department of Civil Protection (DPC) to intervene in the area affected by the tsunami, 
primarily to assist and repatriate Italians.22 On 27 December, the first Italian medical team arrived at 
Unawatuna, in southern Sri Lanka. In the same hours, a few members of the DPC (then followed by 
many others) also landed in the country to recover and assist Italians.  
On 30 December 2004, after a meeting among key institutional actors (but without the Minister of 
Defence), the Presidency of the Council of Ministers approved a decree (no. 305) that attributed the 
main role of management and coordination of the humanitarian actions to the Department of Civil 
Protection, providing an additional contribution of 10 million euros.23 On 1 January 2005, the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs announced another 70 million through the Italian Development 
Cooperation Fund and the creation of a coordinated national committee of the representatives of 
local actors, universities, NGOs, trade unions, and the Red Cross, paving the way for initiatives 
such as the rescheduling of the debt. 
By looking at the national decision-making process in the first days of the crisis, two main elements 
emerge. First, the DPC became the leading actor in the coordination of the NGOs’ activities as well 
as in the management of funds. The head of the DPC, Guido Bertolaso, openly pointed out the 
growing “skills and the competences” of the DPC in managing international cooperation.24 The 
Berlusconi government was visibly aiming to enhance the role of the DPC in the event of national 
and international ‘emergencies’. Decree no. 3388 (then updated after the tsunami) was approved on 
23 December, and it originally attributed specific functions to the DPC in order to provide 
                                                
21 For an overview see ‘Final Report’, Action Aid, 2006. 
22  Decree no. 3389, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 26 December 2004, available at 
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2004/12/29/04A12893/sg 
23 On the first day after the tsunami 3 million were diverted from the emergency development 
cooperation fund. 
24 Quoted in A. Mattone, ‘Vogliono gestire in nostri soldi? La Protezione Civile non si ritira’, La 
Repubblica, 4 January 2005.  
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humanitarian support. The Italian NGOs fiercely criticized the “centralization of the aid”25 while 
institutional contrasts occurred between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Civil Protection 
over the management of private donations (more than 40 million, then supervised by the DPC).26  
Second, and relatedly, the Minister of Defence played a marginal role within the decision-making 
process, while the Minister of Foreign Affairs and also the Minister of the Interior were directly 
involved in the management of the aid. Analysis of the decrees approved by the cabinet at the 
beginning of January reveals the scarce significance of Italian Defence. For instance, in Decree no. 
3392 (8 January 2005) the Minister of Defence was not mentioned at all, while new powers were 
granted to the Head of the DPC for the implementation of humanitarian aid (in coordination with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister). On 10 January, the Undersecretary 
Margherita Boniver affirmed the central role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the humanitarian 
response, stressing the specific functions of manifold institutional actors, without citing the 
Ministry of Defence. The parliamentary debates also reveal the absence of any references to 
military assets or armed forces, while the main focus in the discussion was coordination among 
national and international (UN, EU, etc.) actors, aid transparency, the main sectors of intervention 
(health, education, etc.), and the recovery of Italians across the areas affected by the tsunami.27 The 
only military assets provided by the Defence were a few C-130 airplanes for transportation.28 Thus, 
despite the fact that Sri Lanka was also affected by a civil war, and contrary to other similar cases 
(e.g. Haiti), the Defence was almost totally excluded from the decision-making process. Italy 
preferred to use civilian tools rather than armed forces to intervene. Our two main arguments help 
better understand this ‘disposition’ on the part of the national decision makers.  
                                                
25  For a detailed criticism, see E.Ferrara and S.Radaelli, ‘Aiuti interessati’, LaVoce.info, 21 
February 2005.  
26 See ‘Fini: alla Protezione Civile la gestione dei fondi per l’Asia’, La Repubblica, 4 January 2005.  
27 See, Chamber of Deputies, 5 January 2005; the law decree ‘Humanitarian intervention for the 
population in South-East Asia’, 19 January 2005, and the debate before the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, Chamber of Deputies, 8 February 2005.  
28 Most of the flights were organized directly by the Civil Protection. 
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While the saliency of the ‘interests of the industrial-military complex’ was practically absent in the 
debate, other domestic actors, such as the ‘new’ DPC, which was able to operate notwithstanding 
the current regulations in case of emergency, strongly pushed to ‘rule’ the intervention. The vice 
deputy of the DPC highlighted the “extraordinary power”29 attributed to the Civil Protection. As 
revealed by the DPC Head of the Mission in Sri Lanka, the humanitarian assistance in South-east 
Asia was planned as “something different from the traditional aid assistance, something 
bigger…”.30 From a critical perspective, the representatives of the NGOs denounced the Civil 
Protection’s “quest for visibility” and the “deprivation of the authority” of the Development 
Cooperation Unit (DGCS).31 Moreover, other domestic actors (e.g. the Italian Red Cross), which 
were politically close to the government at that time, played a significant role during the crisis.32 In 
addition, according to some reports33, the considerable presence of Italian associations and NGOs 
on the ground before the tsunami represented a vital factor in explaining why the Development 
Cooperation (especially at regional level) was so involved on the ground. In sum, several domestic 
actors (DPC, Red Cross, NGOs) pushed for a civilian intervention, leaving little room for ‘military 
actors’. 
In line with the ‘humanitarian frame’ the issue of “solidarity in a globalized world” 34  was 
frequently remarked on in the debate. The “generous Italian response” to the devastating crisis 
(where almost 60 Italians died) was widely shared by political leaders and public officials.35 As 
stressed by a parliamentary motion, prompt mobilization for a human tragedy “is part of our identity, 
                                                
29 Vincenzo Spaziante, quoted in ‘Final Report’, ActionAid (2006, 23). 
30 Quoted in ‘Final Report’, Action Aid, 2006 (2006, 22). 
31 See G.Marcon, ‘Dietro lo scontro niente’, Peacelink, 2 January 2005.  
32 The Red Cross played a primary function within the national coordination unit. Like Bertolaso, 
the leader of the Italian Red Cross, Maurizio Scelli, was also given strong political support by the 
Prime Minister, especially after his activism during the controversial Iraqi mission in 2003 (Ignazi 
et al. 2012). 
33 See Rossignoli, Serena, Fabrizio Coticchia and Annarosa Mezzasalma. 2011. Studio preliminare 
per la definizione e la gestione da parte della Regione Toscana degli interventi in situazione di 
emergenza in paesi terzi. Firenze: Regione Toscana. 
34 Motion ‘Spini et al.’, 17043, Chamber of Deputies, General Assembly, 5 January 2005.  
35 See the then Director General of Italian Development Cooperation, Giuseppe Deodato, quoted in 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Le gestione della crisi, il caso Tsunami’, 2005.  
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of our tradition”.36 Italian institutions and citizens share “generosity and solidarity”37  in the event of 
such devastating crises, which need to be addressed by a comprehensive approach, because of the 
“multidimensional nature” of the threat they pose to international security.38 However, all the tools 
portrayed as necessary for recovery and rehabilitation, such as development cooperation, were 
essentially non-military. Despite the existence of a civil war, the logistical problems and the local 
insecurity, the military dimension was totally excluded, to instead focus on “health and 
education”.39 In addition, the debate on the intervention frequently underlined a specific point of the 
Italian law on cooperation: “the funds devoted to development cooperation should not be used for 
any military activities”.40 Reporting the concern of international NGOs on the ways in which the 
humanitarian aid had been carried out, Italian MPs warned about a possible “diversion of funds for 
military activities”.41  
In other words, and differently from other interventions, the interests of the so-called Italian 
‘industrial-military complex’ were absent and the ‘humanitarian frame’ was absolutely 
disconnected from the military dimension, which was openly contrasted. The opposition to any 
deployment of armed forces for aid and reconstruction was visible during all the parliamentary 
debates.42 By looking at the contents of the discussions one may suppose that the “inconsistent 
humanitarian rhetoric” adopted by the government to justify the combat operations in Afghanistan 
and – especially – Iraq (Ignazi et al. 2012) had affected the general attitude towards the use of 
military forces in those months.43 Therefore, the prudent ‘disposition’ of decision makers regarding 
                                                
36 Motion ‘Cortiana et al.’, 813, Senate of the Republic, General Assembly, 31 May 2005. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See Senator Castagnetti (Margherita), General Assembly, 729, Senate, 1 February 2005.  
39 Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gianfranco Fini, Commission of EU Affairs, Chamber of Deputies, 7 
February 2005. 
40 See art.5, Law 49 February 1987 (e.g., Art.1, 5), quoted in Commission of EU Affairs, Chamber 
of Deputies, 7 February 2005. 
41 Senator Malabarba (Refounded Communist), General Assembly, 728, Senate, 27 January 2005.  
42 See the debates in the Senate, General Assembly, 27 January 2005 and before the Foreign Affairs 
Commission, Chamber of Deputies, 8 February 2005. 
43 The peak of the Italian parliamentary debate over the incoherence between the humanitarian 
frame and the combat situation on the ground in Iraq occurred in the summer 2004 (when Italian 
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the employment of troops could have been influenced by this context. At the same time, the 
changing ‘political opportunity structures’ concerning the international role of the DPC fostered the 
significant role played by domestic (non-military) actors.  
The combination of these elements helps trace the very low saliency of the ‘interests of the 
industrial-military complex’ (contrary to the growing interests of other domestic actors, such as the 
DPC), the ‘post-Iraqi disconnection’ in the public debate between the ‘humanitarian culture’ and 
the deployment of armed forces to face non-military challenges, and the decision to undertake a 
civilian operation in Sri Lanka. 
 
3.2) Haiti  
 
On January 2010 an earthquake devastated Haiti, causing more than 250,000 victims. The UN 
strengthened the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which had been on 
the ground since 2004, while the international community quickly started to provide humanitarian 
assistance.44 Italy also played an active role. As happened in the case of Sri Lanka, an ‘advanced 
team’ of experts was deployed at the very beginning of the crisis.45  But this time the Italian 
intervention was deeply based on armed forces.  
By analysing the decision-making process in January/February 2010 it is possible to better compare 
our two arguments and understand why the Italian elites demonstrated such different ‘dispositions’. 
According to the Prime Minister’s Decree (13 January), the “state of emergency” represented the 
legal framework for the Italian involvement in the crisis. Three days after the decree, the first C-130 
provided medical support to the civilian population.46  
                                                                                                                                                            
soldiers were involved in fierce battles in Southern Iraq), just a few months before the tsunami 
(Coticchia, 2014). 
44 UN Resolution No. 1908, 19 January 2010.  
45 See Novazio, Emanuele. 2010. ‘Haiti: connazionali in pericolo’. La Stampa January 10.  
46 Prime Minister’s Decree, N.78, January 13 2010. Rome: Council of Ministers. 
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Contrary to the case of Sri Lanka, the Italian cabinet took the military option to support 
humanitarian efforts into consideration right from the start. The initial “doubts” 47 of the Prime 
Minister on the costs of a military mission were banished after a meeting (on 16 January) with the 
Minister of Defence who assured that the expenses of the operation would be “almost totally 
covered” by Italian military companies.48 After the Joint Command of the Italian armed forces 
positively assessed the feasibility of the mission (on 18 January), the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
declared that a military intervention would assist the humanitarian efforts and rescue operations. 49 
Moreover, for the very first time, the aircraft carrier Cavour would be operationally deployed.  
The day after the green light from the Joint Command, the Cavour started its first operation, 
carrying helicopters, almost one thousand troops and a base hospital. 50  Thus, despite initial 
uncertainties, the decision-making process was extremely quick, in line with the declared “state of 
emergency” and the dramatic needs on the ground. However, it is worth noticing that the aircraft 
carrier did not arrive in Haiti directly from Italy but stopped in Brazil some days before in order to 
involve a local civil-military contingent in a joint mission.  
The Italian military played a leading role in the management of the humanitarian activities in Haiti, 
building schools and hospitals and providing aid distribution.51 At the end of February, the Italian 
Parliament authorized the involvement of a new Italian contingent within the MINUSTAH 
mission.52  
                                                
47 Reported in Gaiani, Gianandrea. 2010. ‘L'intervento italiano ad Haiti: portaerei, terremotati e 
sterili polemiche’. L’Occidentale January 22. Retrieved from http://www.loccidentale.it/node/85797 
48 ‘Haiti, Cavour pronta a salpare con aiuti italiani’, Il Giornale di Sicilia, 17 January 2010.  
49 Speech reported by the US Department of State. Retrieved from: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135727.htm 
50 For a detailed analysis of the operation see the official report provided by the Italian Navy, 
Magliola, Operazione White Crane, 2013.  
51 ‘Rientrata la portaerei Cavour La Russa: Siamo orgogliosi’. 2010. Il Corriere della Sera, April 
15: 6. 
52 Operation ‘Caravella’ followed the ‘White Crane’ mission. Chamber of Deputies, 24 February 
2010. 
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 ‘White Crane’ , which approved the deployment of armed forces with the aim of “assisting the 
local population”, was labelled by the government as a “humanitarian relief mission”. 53  The 
operation was largely viewed by politicians as a complex emergency demanding “a comprehensive 
approach” while the armed forces were considered the most appropriate tool to address such 
challenges.54 The case of Haiti reveals the significance of the Italian ‘humanitarian strategic and 
military culture’, as well as the logic of ‘appropriateness’ behind the decision to employ the Cavour. 
The suitable features of the carrier (as well as the proper role of the armed forces) in the 
humanitarian emergency have constantly been at the centre of the debate. As reported by the 
Ministry of Defence, because of the lack of adequate harbours after the earthquake, the Cavour 
“proved to be the only tool capable of providing assistance rapidly and at a great distance”.55 Italy's 
aircraft carrier provided logistical and operational support to the relief efforts in particular as a 
platform for the helicopters, as a supplier of sanitary assistance offered by the hospital on board, 
and as a tool for multilateral cooperation (as proved by the cooperation developed with Brazil)56.  
Analysis of the Haitian case illustrates the noteworthy role of the ‘humanitarian frame’. As noted 
above, a bipartisan consensus emerged in labelling ‘White Crane’ as a “humanitarian mission”. 
According to the cabinet, the involvement of armed forces does not contrast the image of Italy as an 
“international peacekeeper” but rather it “fully corresponds to the deepest values” of Italy and its 
global role.57 As occurred in the public debate concerning the crisis in Sri Lanka, the values of 
“solidarity and humanitarian aid” took centre stage in the discussion in parliament.58 In this case 
these principles were directly connected to the employment of the aircraft carrier, whose goal was 
                                                
53 Chamber of Deputies, 1 March 2010.  
54 See X and Y (2016). 
55 http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_int_concluse/Haiti_OpWhiteCrane/notizie_teatro/Pagi
ne/Haiti_Rientra_in_Italia_la_portae_11510Cavour.aspx 
56  ‘Haiti, Cavour pronta a salpare con aiuti italiani’. 2010. Il Giornale di Sicilia January 17. 
Retrieved from http://gds.it/2010/01/17/haiti-cavour-pronta-a-salpare-con-aiuti-italiani-
90520_222068/  
57 Italian Minister of Culture, quoted in ‘Haiti, Cavour pronta a salpare’, 2010.  
58  See for instance, the Minister of Defence, Ignazio La Russa, III Commission, Chamber of 
Deputies, 20 January 2010.  
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to help “the suffering population of Haiti”. 59  The Naval Forces linked ’White Crane’ to the 
traditional Italian “attitude of solidarity” too.60 
Notwithstanding this shared view, the crisis caused by the earthquake was never viewed in the 
public and parliamentary debate as a ‘direct threat’ to Italian national security. Thus, the 
‘humanitarian frame’ alone cannot properly illustrate why Italian decision makers revealed different 
‘dispositions’ in Sri Lanka and Haiti. As stated above, the military culture and the logic of 
appropriateness in the employment of a carrier (e.g. providing crucial support in terms of quick 
intervention and because of the absence of safe harbours) could highlight some relevant aspects 
relating to the Haitian context. But only by assessing domestic economic interests can we 
comprehend the divergent choices adopted by the Italian governments. 
In fact, the analysis of the national debate on the mission strongly confirms the argument that the 
‘military-industrial complex’ pushed Italy to adopt military tools in the case of the ‘White Crane’ 
mission and that the pressure posed by military lobbies drove Italy to employ the Cavour. The 
operation represented the very first test for the most advanced and expensive national military asset, 
while fostering multinational cooperation (e.g. with Brazil) and enhancing the visibility of the 
national military industries. In particular, it is key to underline that Italian companies paid the costs 
relating to the deployment of the aircraft carrier: 90% of the expenses were covered by ENI, 
Finmeccanica and Fincantieri, all companies formerly involved in building the carrier. Such 
economic support was exactly the outcome expected by the Italian defence reform that the cabinet 
had advanced a few months before the mission. Indeed, a new holding (Difesa Servizi Spa) was 
crafted specifically to increase commercial activities to develop “new sponsorships”.  
Also, gaining ‘visibility’ for Italian military equipment was a manifest objective of the mission, 
which was considered as an “investment” for Italian manufacturing. Several newspapers reported 
                                                
59 Italian Government, 2010. 
60 The spokesperson of the Naval Operation reported in Magliola, Operazione White Crane, 2013. 
The decision to deploy the Cavour was also embraced within the broader and controversial debate 
on contemporary ‘humanitarian relief’ and civil-military coordination (X and Y 2016).  
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anonymous statements by officers who stressed the importance of ‘White Crane’ to support Italian 
industry: “showing Italian technology is a way to promote it”61. In fact, the ‘marketing operation’ 
seemed to have an effect: inspired by the Cavour, the Indian Navy asked for a technology transfer 
to build their carrier. The joint mission with Brazil has largely been viewed as confirmation of this 
standpoint. Indeed, after the mission, the two countries signed an agreement in the field of defence 
and security, especially regarding the Navy62. Finally, as openly recognized by armed forces and 
government members, ‘White Crane’ was a “formidable test”63 for the versatility of the Cavour, 
which was one of the supposed key features of its original design plan. Even some members of the 
opposition recognized that the “cost of inaction” for the Cavour was almost the same as that of 
deployment. Thus, the carrier ‘needed’ an operation. And the sponsorship by national military 
companies contributed to removing possible government hesitations regarding the costs. 
 
3.4) EUNAVOFOR MED 
 
With Council decision no. 2015/972 of 22 June 2015 the European Union launched a military 
operation in the South-central Mediterranean, Operation EUNAVFOR MED.64 The operation was 
approved on 18 May, with decision no. 2015/778, shortly after one of the worst tragedies to have 
ever occurred in the Mediterranean (19 April 2016). Aside from the aim to “disrupt the business 
model of human smuggling and trafficking networks” it was also aimed at preventing “the further 
                                                
61 Cadalanu, Giampaolo. 2010. ‘Difesa spa, una nuova agenzia per il business delle spese militari’. 
La Repubblica February 1 Retrieved from 
http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2010/02/01/news/difesa_spa-2149311/ 
62 Cupellaro, Fiammetta. 2011. ‘Frattini: L’Italia non rompe con il Brasile’. La Repubblica January 
6. Retrieved from 
http://ricerca.gelocal.it/ilpiccolo/archivio/ilpiccolo/2011/01/06/NZ_05_APRE.html  
63  Magliola, Valerio. 2013. Operazione White Crane. Ufficio pubblica informazione Marina 
Militare. Retrieved from 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/conosciamoci/editoria/notiziario/Documents/speciali/2013_04_WhiteCr
ane.pdf 
64 European Council (2015), Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/972, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 23 June 2015. 
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loss of lives at sea”.65 Specifically relating to this latter aspect, the operation was renamed ‘Sophia’ 
following the birth of a Somali baby on a German ship of the EUNAVFOR MED task force bearing 
the name of the Prussian princess Sophia. Structured initially in three phases, the operations would 
need the explicit consent of the newborn Libyan government to operate in anti-smuggling mode in 
Libyan waters, or alternatively a UN resolution.66  
Since the very start, Italy proposed itself as lead nation in the operation (which is still running). The 
operative command is in Rome. Admiral Enrico Credendino was appointed Operation Commander. 
The operation’s flagship is the same Cavour discussed in the previous case of Haiti. Italy 
contributes with a submarine, two drones (MQ-1 and MQ-9), and sanitary facilities. Law decree no. 
99 of 8 July 2015 67  authorized the participation of Italian military personnel in Operation 
EUNAVFOR MED with 1020 units, and initially set aside an amount of 26 million euros for this 
purpose.68 The law decree underlined the necessity and the urgency to employ military personnel in 
the European Mission.69  
The analysis of the political debate that led to the decision to use military means in this specific case 
has cast light on a particularly articulated set of logics that may be related to both the arguments 
made above. As occurred in the case of Sri Lanka, the ‘military’ option was contested by a part of 
the political spectrum as non-appropriate to cope with the challenges it was designed for, and in 
                                                
65 European Union External Action (2016), European Union Naval Force-Mediterranean, Operation 
Sophia, 21 June 2016. 
66  Since 20 June 2016 the mission has also had the supporting tasks of training the Libyan 
coastguards and navy and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high 
seas off the coast of Libya. 
67 Law decree converted into law by article 1 (first paragraph, of law no. 117 of 4 August 2015). 
68 Chamber of Deputies (2016), ‘Partecipazione di Personale Militare all’Operazione EUNAVFOR-
MED: il decreto legge n. 99 del 2015’, Italian Parliament, 18 January 2016, available at 
http://www.camera.it/leg17/522?tema=partecipazione_di_personale_militare_all_operazione_eunav
for_med#one_italiana_alla_missione_militare_eunavfor_med  
69 Italian Senate, Fascicolo Iter DDL S. 1997, 20 June 2016. 
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particular to save migrants’ lives.70 Nonetheless, this time armed forces were employed to address 
non-military challenges.  
In accordance with a multidimensional perspective of contemporary security, smuggling was 
considered an extremely worrisome phenomenon by all the political parties, to be tackled somehow, 
albeit with different emphases. In a late-June parliamentary debate, representatives of the 
government particularly stressed the role of Italy in promoting and obtaining European consensus 
on the anti-smuggling operation, on a detailed political commitment to it and on the recognition of 
the centrality of the Central Mediterranean contexts for the overall security of the European 
Union. 71  Hence, and in conformity with the ‘humanitarian culture’, the operation, strongly 
supported by Italy, was a tool to highlight solidarity, values and ideals, which invited to share 
responsibility in an increasingly dangerous phenomenon.72 Italy, according to Undersecretary of 
Defence Rossi, “has in its DNA principles deriving from a millenarian culture that it cannot betray 
at the risk of betraying its history and its future”.73 This kind of operation, it was underlined, should 
be interpreted as the utmost manifestation of EU distinctiveness in terms of values, solidarity, ideals 
and common sharing.74 The role of ‘lead nation’, it was emphasized, was a way to prove even 
further the argument of responsibility by Italy against the smuggling of human beings in the 
Mediterranean.75 Indeed, after the experience of ‘Mare Nostrum’ (unilaterally led by Italy), the EU 
member states were called to act more proactively to avoid the deaths of migrants at sea, which 
were directly linked to the smuggling phenomenon.76  
                                                
70 Doubts have also been expressed regarding the unclear path of an operation conceived ‘in phases’ 
and significantly dependent upon external bonds for its full completion. See Paolo Romani in Italian 
Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission, 25 June 2015. 
71 Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission, 25 June 2015. 
72  Gian Piero Scanu in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Commission,25 June 2015. 
73 Domenico Rossi in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission,, 
25 June 2015. 
74 Gian Piero Scanu in Italian Chamber of Deputies, 25 June 2015. 
75 Luigi Compagna in Italian Senate,, Fascicolo Iter DDL S. 1997, 20 June 2016,  
76 The operation was contextualized in the broader debate regarding the stabilization of Libya. As 
emphasized by Undersecretary for Defence Rossi, the crisis in Libya was the main factor behind 
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The anti-smuggling operation paved the way for a broader discussion on Italy’s ‘humanitarian aim’ 
in the face of a soaring inflow of migrants in 2015. On the one hand, and in line with a 
‘humanitarian narrative’, the operation was aimed at saving migrants at sea when necessary 
according to the Law of the Sea.77 Hence, this argument insisted on the humanitarian objective. On 
the other hand, and in contrast to a humanitarian logic, the operation was seen as very close to a 
naval blockade, fundamental to hampering the continuous flows of arrivals in Italy. 78   This 
argument was sustained by anti-immigration positions within the country which made clear that the 
operation had not to repeat the shortcomings of operations such as ‘Mare Nostrum’ which had 
ended up acting as a ‘pull’ for migrants and smugglers.79 The eventual destruction of the boats was 
intended as a way to diminish possible arrivals on the Italian territory.80 Therefore, while there was 
a wide recognition that Italy had a responsibility to contrast the smuggling phenomenon, there was 
no correspondent recognition of the responsibility to welcome all migrants in distress at sea, also 
given the fact that this may weaken the naval device.81  
The widespread appearance of the ‘appropriateness’ logic has also been observed, to demonstrate 
that the military was the most appropriate tool to deploy for the objectives of such an operation. 
Particularly emphasized by both representatives of the ‘Marina Militare’ and a broad array of the 
political spectrum, the military instrument was not only fitting but also necessary. According to 
Admiral De Giorgi before the competent Commissions in the Parliament in July 2015, the Italian 
navy normally operates in high seas and could benefit (differently from other European countries) 
from a direct relation with the Italian judiciary, which would allow timely action in case of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
increased migrant flows in the Mediterranean and hence increased economic opportunities for their 
exploitation by smugglers. Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Commission, 25 June 2015. 
77  Domenico Rossi in Italian Chamber of Deputies (2015), Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Commission, 25 June 2015; Nicola La Torre, Italian Senate (2016). 
78 Senator Sergio Divina, in Italian Senate (2016). 
79 Bruno Alicata in Italian Senate (2016); Maurizio Gasparri, Italian Senate (2016). 
80 Elio Vito in Chamber of Deputies, General Assembly, 30 July 2015. 
81 Bruno Alicata in Italian Senate (2016). 
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detection of smugglers.82 He insisted that engaging in search and rescue operations would be quite 
easy for a military ship, given the advanced command and control systems at its disposal compared 
to those, for example, of the Capitaneria di Porto, and given its constant presence at sea.83 The 
future of Italian military vessels, according to the former Navy Commander-in-Chief, cannot but be 
dual: Italy is already programming offshore patrols with dedicated reception spaces (sewage 
systems, devices for electricity, large spaces, etc.), essentially because Italy’s responsibility goes 
well beyond its territorial waters.84 With infrared device, helicopters may help save migrants’ lives 
in poorly detectible situations.85 The employment of the Cavour had to be inserted within the 
broader argument of Italy as ‘lead nation’ seen before: in this sense, the flagship ensured the proper 
management of the operation in all its phases thanks to its equipment, experience and ability to 
include different units.86 The carrier’s logistic and sanitary capabilities (absent in other vessels) 
would add to its ability to deal with rescue operations.87  
Interests relating to the military-industrial complex seem to have also played a role, given that, 
according to many positions, the assets displayed and in particular the Cavour were openly 
questioned with respect to the aim of fighting smuggling and rescuing migrants.88 While obtaining a 
naval law allocating more than 5 billion in 2013 to refurbish an ageing navy89 and to sustain the 
national industry90 and asking 5 billion more in 2015, Admiral De Giorgi insisted on the necessity 
to support the operation by employing equipment likely to ensure Italy’s credibility at the 
                                                
82 Admiral Giuseppe De Giorgi in Italian Senate, 7 July 2015. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Domenico Rossi in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission, 
25 June 2015. 
87 Domenico Rossi in Chamber of Deputies General Assembly, 30 July 2015. 
88 Gianluca Pini in Chamber of Deputies, General Assembly, 30 July 2015; Massimo Artini in 
Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs Commission, 25 June 2015. 
89 Crecchi, Paolo (2016), Ecco la nuova ‘nave balena’ che salverà i barconi di profughi, La Stampa, 
12 June 2016. 
90 Martinelli, Giovanni (2015), ‘Le opportunità della legge navale’, AnalisiDifesa, 27 July 2015. 
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international level as well as its leading role in the Mediterranean.91  However, critics of this 
ponderous naval engagement in the operation maintained that military personnel were unfit to meet 
the objectives of the mission.92  In particular, it was argued that saving migrants’ life did not 
necessary require military mean, a consideration that can partly be accepted if looking at the role of 
NGOs and private vessels. Also, proper anti-smuggling operation could be effective in the case of 
operations in Libyan territorial waters (has happened in the case of operation Atalanta in Somalia). 
Some raised the question of concealed finalities behind the deployment of the flagship, such as the 
transportation of special units to be eventually employed in Libya,93 while others framed it as a 
prelude to a ‘militarization’ of the Mediterranean.94 More to that, and similarly to the case of Haiti, 
the argument was made that the use of specific military assets and in particular of the Cavour for 
such an operation was a way to exhibit Italy’s military equipment, a sort of “floating fair for ‘made 
in Italy’ weapons”.95 According to some others, the hidden interests behind the deployment of such 
military assets (hidden plans about about Libya but also the possibility of exhibiting Italian assets) 
were all the more relevant given the high costs of the operation and given that ‘high costs’ were at 
the basis of the demise of Operation Mare Nostrum.96 Simply ‘moving’ the Cavour would require a 
huge amount of money.97 
Summing up, the humanitarian culture was particularly crucial for the decision to deploy the 
military in the Central Mediterranean also because meeting an increasingly vocal concern at the 
European level, which stressed the case for military operations to curb smugglers’ business and so 
                                                
91 ‘Migranti, De Giorgi: Senza Marina e Capitaneria avremmo migliaia di morti’, AdnKronos 9 June 
2016. 
92  Roberto Cotti in Italian Senate (2016); Andrea Causin in Chamber of Deputies, General 
Assembly, 30 July 2015. 
93 Paolo Romani and Marco Marcolin in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Commission, 25 June 2015. 
94  Donatella Duranti in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Commission, 25 June 2015. 
95 Piovesana, Enrico (2016), ‘Marina militare, la “nave umanitaria” si trasforma in portaerei’, Il 
Fatto Quotidiano, 14 April 2016. 
96  Donatella Duranti in Italian Chamber of Deputies, Joint Defense and Foreign Affairs 
Commission, 25 June 2015; Bruno Alicata, in Italian Senate (2016). 
97 Roberto Cotti in Italian Senate (2016). 
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save migrants’ life, especially at the EU’s doorstep. The military culture argument has also proved 
relevant in the debate, with a quite articulated argumentation. The second argument has appeared in 
the debate too, although particularly mentioned by critical positions toward the operation: for many, 
the unfitness of the military to face the challenges reported in the ‘humanitarian narrative’ and yet 
the deployment of military means had to be explained with hidden domestic economic interests, be 
they related to the future of Libya or to the opportunity of showing Italian maritime equipment to 
other Mediterranean states. 
 
4) Findings and Conclusion 
 
The article has provided two non-exclusive arguments in order to understand interventions with 
military means in cases of non-military multidimensional challenges. The analysis of public and 
parliamentary debates has assessed the different weight of ideational elements and domestic 
interests in the decision-making process that led to interventions in Sri Lanka, Haiti and the 
Mediterranean with military means. In sum, the empirical section illustrates possible co-existing 
interpretations as regards the employment of the Italian armed forces in dealing with 
multidimensional challenges. Table 1 summarizes the main findings. 
The role of the national ‘humanitarian strategic and military culture’ has been confirmed as 
generally relevant, especially regarding the suitability of the military instrument for facing 
multidimensional challenges. The anti-smuggling operation EUNAVFOR MED (Sophia) was 
interpreted as key for Italian security and for the security of the Mediterranean region at large, the 
latter forming the peninsula’s main strategic perimeter. A part of the political spectrum particularly 
emphasized Italy and the EU’s responsibility for contrasting smuggling phenomena with a view to 
migrants’ safety, even though the arguments supporting the operation diverged with reference to its 
impact on migration flows towards Italy. 
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Table 1. Humanitarian culture, interests and military operations  
 
Cases 
Arguments 
Sri Lanka Haiti EUNAVFOR-
MED  
Humanitarian culture Extremely 
Relevant 
Relevant  Extremely 
Relevant 
Interests (Absent) Extremely 
relevant 
Relevant 
Outcome Civilian 
intervention  
Military 
intervention 
Military  
intervention 
 
Notwithstanding the different opinions and the arguments for possible alternatives, the necessity of 
the military in the operation was particularly underlined, especially because of the double objective 
to fight smugglers and save migrants’ life. The same logic of appropriateness was adopted in the 
case of Haiti to justify the employment of the aircraft carrier Cavour. Finally, also after the dramatic 
tsunami in Sri Lanka, a widespread humanitarian frame was deeply shared among political leaders.   
While ‘humanitarian culture’, as well as the logic of appropriateness behind political decisions, 
have generally been important, the interests of the ‘military-industrial complex’ vary in their 
influence across the cases. Thus, the lack of such interests (be they self-evident, reported or sensed 
from the parliamentary or public debate) seems to be the most relevant obstacle to militarily 
addressing multidimensional challenges, as occurred in the case of Sri Lanka, where the military 
option was totally discarded, also because of the growing domestic interests of non-military actors 
(such as the Civil Protection, NGOs, etc.). In sum, the analysis of our three cases illustrates how the 
absence of interests of the so-called Italian ‘industrial-military complex’ seems crucial in shaping 
the  ‘dispositions’ of Italian decision-makers towards the deployment of civilian forces to address 
non-military threats. While only a general contestation of military tools, as occurred in the debates 
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before EUNAVFOR MED and the intervention in Sri Lanka, has not prevented Italian leaders from 
employing troops if there are significant military interests on the ground.  
The paper is a first attempt to understand why Italy adopts specifically military tools to face non-
military challenges. Additional research is needed to corroborate, and generalize, the main findings 
as well as to potentially compare them with those of other countries. For example, it would be 
extremely interesting to assess the weight of the arguments made in other European countries 
regarding the same cases analysed for Italy. Do moral responsibilities play a role in the decision to 
intervene militarily? Do other armed forces perceive themselves as security providers? How shared 
is the consensus around new non-military threats and what role can the military play in dealing with 
them? These and more research questions are strongly encouraged to comparatively assess the role 
of the armed forces in the new security scenario. 
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